Ukrainian radio engineer and aerial reconnaissance specialist Yuriy Kasyanov has stated that to enable Ukrainian strike drones to reach targets in Saint Petersburg and Moscow, enhancements are necessary to reduce their radar, sound, and visual signatures. He emphasized the need for drones to be small in size and have a smaller payload and engines, constructed using stealth technologies, minimizing metal usage and completely eliminating carbon materials.
On his Facebook page, Kasyanov highlighted that small long-range strike drones are capable of reaching the center of the Russian capital.
He noted that a large payload, such as 100 kilograms, provides little benefit if the drone cannot accurately hit its target, especially when Russian forces are “jammin” internet and satellite feeds. Kasyanov underlined the requirement for inexpensive and inconspicuous drones that could reach Moscow and Saint Petersburg nightly, causing closures at Russian airports and instilling fear among Russians and the Kremlin leadership.
However, Kasyanov criticized the current focus of Ukrainian authorities on expensive drones priced over $100,000, which lack the capability to overcome the air defense of the Russian capital and Saint Petersburg. He asserted that Ukraine currently does not have official mandates from the Ministry of Defense for stealth and small unmanned aerial vehicles capable of breaching air defenses.
Ukrainian Drone “Lyuty” Tactics for Strikes on Russia
Social media has shared a video showing the recent flight of the Ukrainian kamikaze drone “Lyuty” at a low altitude near Sochi, utilizing either a radio altimeter or a laser altimeter. The video indicates that mobile Russian air defense units were unable to hit the rapidly moving drone as it flew through the strike zone.
Kasyanov explained that flying at low altitudes makes it more difficult for Russian forces to detect and destroy the drone. He added that radars can only see targets within line of sight, making it challenging to identify the drone when it navigates behind buildings and trees.
“Another advantage of low-altitude flight is that it is easier to obtain reliable satellite navigation signals to adjust the route,” the expert remarked.
Kasyanov pointed out that most of the time, long-range drones operate without satellite assistance, relying instead on inertial navigation systems. He explained that “jammin satellites” during attacks with “Shaheds” is not only unnecessary but counterproductive, as it hampers the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defenses.
Moreover, Kasyanov claimed that flying “Lyuty” drones at ultra-low altitudes reduces the risk of being shot down by surface-to-air missiles since Russian systems are often unable to detect and engage them in time.
“The missile’s guidance head fails to acquire the target in time if it is present, and tracking by radar is disrupted if the missile is controlled by a radio channel,” he noted.
Kasyanov reported that Ukrainian strike drones have been flying at low altitudes for over a year, and this remains their primary method to reach targets.
The military expert explained that the operation of interceptor drones at low altitudes is less effective because the operator must launch the interceptor, catch up to the drone, maintain communication, and successfully hit it.
Kasyanov reiterated that the occupiers frequently shoot down Ukrainian drones in areas with dense air defense systems, where multiple surface-to-air missile systems and radars are present. He pointed out that the “Pantsir-SMD-E” system was specifically developed by Russia to combat drones and is equipped with new anti-drone missiles and radars with phased array capabilities for simultaneous attacks on multiple UAVs. He stated that once “Pantsir” detects a target, its anti-aircraft missile is immediately launched to intercept it.
Kasyanov acknowledged that due to the notably dense air defense, Ukrainian long-range drones rarely reach Moscow or Saint Petersburg.
Russian Tactics with “Shahed” Drones
Kasyanov noted that Russian forces have been launching their kamikaze drones at altitudes exceeding one kilometer, where mobile firing groups with small arms cannot reach them. He added that Ukraine has very few surface-to-air missiles, which limits their availability during drone attack repulsion.
The expert indicated that helicopters have shown their effectiveness as interceptors against “Shaheds.” He pointed out that in Russia, helicopters utilize air-to-air missiles (which are plentiful) while Ukraine resorts to machine guns.
Although interceptors can shoot down “Shaheds” at higher altitudes (hundreds of “Shaheds” have been downed this way), the effectiveness remains limited due to a shortage of operators and guidance radars for these drones.
“Additionally, since GPS signals are continually jammed during attacks, mobile interception groups cannot always effectively utilize information on “Shahed” flight paths, which simply means they often do not know where to proceed for interception,” Kasyanov emphasized.
He warned that soon Russian kamikaze drones may be equipped with onboard electronic warfare systems, learn to perform anti-aircraft maneuvers, and switch to jet engines.
“Then, our highly publicized narrative about interceptor drones will be discarded, massive funds will be wasted, and a reliable air defense system will continue to elude us. The only viable solution is the development of our own surface-to-air missile systems,” the expert added.
Kasyanov asserts that reliance on interceptor drones rather than surface-to-air missile systems is a misguided decision that is already costing Ukraine dearly.
