As Europe embarks on a substantial investment in military capabilities to enhance its defenses and bridge the gap with U.S. firepower, the ramifications of these spending choices will shape the continent’s industrial landscape for years to come, reports 24brussels.
In June, NATO members reached a consensus to allocate 3.5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) towards defense in alignment with military capability requirements established in the alliance’s defense strategy.
This commitment translates into an annual expenditure spike of approximately €270 billion for the 23 EU states that are part of NATO, as estimated by the Bruegel think tank. These funds are projected to significantly benefit the defense sector and bolster military recruitment efforts.
A crucial inquiry is whether European nations will focus on cultivating their domestic defense industries or continue their reliance on American-made military hardware.
NATO’s spending obligations set broad targets, allowing each member to independently determine their specific acquisitions and suppliers.
European allies are divided in their strategic approach, with some heavily investing in U.S. equipment while others prioritize European alternatives, each path presenting distinct short- and long-term implications.
On the spectrum
U.S.-manufactured systems offer clear advantages. High-end options such as the F-35 fighter jet or Patriot air-defense systems are costly yet provide a quick means for governments to meet NATO’s spending prerequisites.
For numerous underfunded militaries, such substantial purchases represent the fastest route to demonstrating improvement after prolonged periods of neglect.
The Patriot system exemplifies this situation. One battery costs around $1 billion, with each interceptor missile priced approximately at $4 million.
Recently, a coalition of European countries agreed to acquire additional Patriot systems, further boosting their defense budgets and dependency on U.S. equipment. In contrast, a European counterpart, the Franco-Italian SAMP/T battery with Aster 30 missiles, offers a cost-effective alternative at about one-third of the price.
France and Spain contend that fostering a robust European defense industry is essential for national security; thus, France typically refrains from purchasing U.S. weaponry when alternative options are available.
Alongside Germany, the two nations are collaborating on the ambitious Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, aimed at developing a next-generation fighter jet as a European response to foreign options, notably those from the U.S.
Conversely, Poland’s national security strategy is centered on swiftly obtaining military hardware in substantial quantities, irrespective of the supplier.
As Europe’s preeminent defense spender, Warsaw has more than doubled its military budget in five years, substantially increased its military personnel, and upgraded its F-16 fleet while acquiring new fifth-generation F-35 jets.
The Polish armed forces have also procured extensive quantities of rocket launchers, over 100 helicopters, dozens of heavy tanks, and additional equipment. Speed in military equipment acquisition is a cornerstone of Poland’s growing partnership with South Korean defense manufacturers.
While Poland is cautious of major European defense initiatives, it maintains strong connections with various U.S. defense contractors.
Is reliance on the US healthy?
Over the years, most European NATO forces have heavily invested in American military equipment, presuming that this would ensure a stronger alignment with Washington, the leading power within the military alliance.
However, the return of Donald Trump to the White House this year, coupled with his administration’s ambiguous assurances regarding American support during conflicts, has prompted European governments to reassess whether procuring U.S. defense gear truly ensures influence or favorable treatment.
Critics argue that further investments in U.S. equipment do little to alleviate Europe’s dependence on American technology or encourage the development of local defense industries.
The NATO spending commitments do not provide incentives for purchasing European-manufactured products that could enhance domestic industrial capabilities.
Instead, the GDP-based goals may reward excessive spending on high-cost equipment or large quantities of ineffectual gear to illustrate financial allocations, favoring overseas suppliers with rapid delivery capabilities—often U.S. or South Korean—while many European production lines are struggling with significant backlogs, particularly in missile and ammunition manufacturing.
This arms race has already led to a surge in prices within the global defense market, driven by heightened demand following Russia’s extensive invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The cost of NATO-standard 155mm artillery shells has increased fourfold, soaring from approximately €2,000 pre-war to around €8,000 recently.
However, an exclusive focus on budget figures risks emphasizing appearance over actual effectiveness and combat readiness. This criticism was voiced by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez when he rejected NATO’s new GDP-based targets, asserting that Spain could fulfill the required military capabilities at a significantly lower expenditure.
Despite these reservations, NATO members committed to these spending targets at the June summit in The Hague, and they will strive to meet these obligations in the ensuing years. The alliance conducts annual assessments of progress, adding pressure to fulfill these commitments.
(mm, bts, cp)
