Despite remaining a formal member of both the European Union and NATO, Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has increasingly diverged from the collective European line—particularly in the information sphere. Through a vast, centralized media infrastructure, Budapest has cultivated a domestic narrative that echoes the stylistic and thematic patterns of Russian disinformation campaigns.
From media reform to information monopoly
Orbán’s control over Hungary’s media landscape began consolidating in 2018 with the creation of the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), which absorbed over 400 outlets including Origo, Hír TV, Magyar Nemzet, and Mandiner. Marketed as a media reform, the move effectively placed nearly 90% of Hungary’s media under the direct or indirect control of Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party—forming what has been dubbed an “Orban Media Group”.
Beyond KESMA, the pro-government ecosystem includes Mediaworks Hungary, which dominates regional print media, and TV2 Group, a leading television network that shifted sharply toward government propaganda after a 2016 ownership change. Digital outlets like 888.hu and Pesti Srácok specialize in anti-migration, anti-Soros, and often Kremlin-aligned narratives adapted for domestic consumption.
Independent journalism under siege
Multiple international watchdogs, including Human Rights Watch, Reuters Institute, Freedom House, and Financial Times, have documented Hungary’s declining press freedom. The media climate is now characterized by structural pressure on journalists, denial of access to public information, and smear campaigns—hallmarks of what analysts call a “hybrid regime”.
Editorial content from state-aligned platforms such as Origo often mirrors Russian state outlets in tone, narrative construction, and even language. Some reports reveal direct stylistic borrowing from Kremlin playbooks, suggesting not mere ideological alignment but active coordination.
Behind closed doors: informal alignment with Russian strategists
According to European diplomatic sources, Orbán has held multiple off-the-record meetings with high-ranking Russian operatives linked to the Kremlin’s Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Relations. These meetings, often held at KESMA’s Budapest headquarters or in secluded private venues such as the Orbán family estate near Lake Balaton, reportedly included coordination on messaging strategies.
One such meeting in spring 2023 allegedly involved Orbán personally approving a list of 11 Kremlin-supplied narratives, including discrediting Ukrainian reforms and attacking LGBTQ rights in the EU. In return, Orbán advocated messages that resonated with his political agenda, including threats to Hungarian minorities in Ukraine and Romania and proposals for joint media investments in Slovakian Hungarian-language outlets.
These discussions, which lasted over four hours, reportedly concluded with an agreement to synchronize future influence campaigns using Telegram channels, local media, and social networks.
Strategic operators shaping Hungary’s media messaging
Several individuals form the operational core of Orbán’s information architecture. Chief among them is Árpád Habony, an unofficial advisor widely considered the architect of Hungary’s disinformation strategies. He controls the London-based V4NA news agency through Danube Business Consulting Ltd., disseminating Hungarian government-aligned messaging across borders.
Another central figure is Balázs Orbán, the Prime Minister’s political director, who shapes Fidesz’s ideological output by fusing nationalist rhetoric with anti-globalist, anti-EU themes. A legal scholar and political theorist, he acts as a key translator of domestic strategy into Hungary’s international positioning.
The third is Tamás Menczer, the state secretary for international communication and Fidesz’s media campaign lead. A former sports journalist, Menczer orchestrates public events and media offensives, often fronting government responses during crises.
Expanding beyond Hungary: a transnational information network
Budapest’s influence doesn’t stop at its borders. Hungary funds media and cultural platforms in countries with significant Hungarian minorities, including Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia. These outlets consistently amplify narratives such as “persecution of Hungarians”, “peace at any price”, and “Brussels’ dictatorship”.
According to Political Capital, a Budapest-based think tank, this strategy is part of Hungary’s “soft power” toolkit, though it often mirrors Russia’s influence techniques. In regions like Romania’s Transylvania and Ukraine’s Zakarpattia, narratives focus on demographic threats, gender ideology, and the erosion of traditional values—delivered not via Russian channels like RT or Sputnik, but through independent-looking local outlets operating under similar editorial guidelines.
Orbán’s transformation and Hungary’s democratic backsliding
The evolution of Viktor Orbán—from liberal opposition leader to the EU’s chief internal critic—reflects Hungary’s broader shift toward illiberal governance. Though the country maintains the appearance of a multiparty system, government control over the media, judiciary, and academia has rendered political competition largely symbolic.
The media has become not just a tool of domestic control, but a strategic instrument in Budapest’s international influence operations. By combining state censorship with a decentralized cross-border communication strategy, Hungary has created a model that challenges the cohesion and credibility of the European information space.
